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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this appeal, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office (herein CCPA) and
amicus, the Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association (herein IP AA) allege that the District Court
erred in granting Mr. Jamee Wade's (herein Mr. Wade or Respondent) public writings request
per Title 9, Chapter Three of the Idaho Statutes, the Idaho Public Writings Act.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The CCPA appeals from the MEMORANDUM DECSION ON PETTION FOR
ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS (R., pp.50-54) and the MEMORANDUM DECISION TO
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT (R., pp. 99-102). Respondent asserts that the decisions of the
District Court were correct and should be affirmed.

A. The Course of Proceedings and Factual Background
On December 22, 2011, Mr. Wade was shot twice and injured by a city of Fruitland
Police Officer. Cognizant of the requirement that Mr. Wade had to file a tort claim on or before
June 19, 2012, Mr. Wade, through counsel per Idaho Code Sections 9-337 - 9-347, requested
copies of the completed Idaho State Police, Fruitland Police Department, and Payette County
Sheriffs Department investigations into the officer involved shooting of Mr. Wade (R., pp. 2729). On March 30, 2012, the Respondent denied Mr. Wade's request relying on Idaho Code
Section 9-335 without addressing the rationale for its decision (R., pp. 35-36). On April 19,
2012, Mr. Wade, per Idaho Code Section 9-343(1), filed a Petition for Access to Public Records
and requested an expedited hearing (R., pp. 3-38). On April 27, 2012, the Respondent filed an
Answer to Mr. Wade's Petition (R., pp. 39-42). A brief hearing was held in Court on May 4,
2012, which hearing was continued until May 17,2012 (R., p.1). At the May 17,2012, hearing,
the Court concluded that it would be necessary for it to review the records contained in the
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Respondent's file in camera (R., p.l).

On June 5, 2012, the Court having completed its in

camera review, issued its Memorandum Decision on Petition for Access to Public Records
granting Mr. Wade's request and ordering the Respondent to make the record public and provide
the same to Mr. Wade (R., pp. 50-34). On June 6, 2012, Appellant submitted its Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgment (R., pp. 55-56). On June 12,2012, the Appellant filed its Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., pp. 63-82) wherein Appellant included in its
"Factual & Procedural Background" section what it termed as its "generalized synopsis" based
on "current reports and investigation." (R., pp. 63-82)1 On June 13, 2012, Appellant filed a
Motion to Stay the Proceedings Pending Decision on Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R.,
p. 1). On June 14, 2012, the Court issued its Order to Stay Proceeding Pending Decision on
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., p. 1). On June 14,2012, the Court issued a Notice of
Hearing, which set June 28, 2012, at 10:00 a.m., as the time the Court would hear oral argument
on Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., p.1). On June 19,2012, Respondent
submitted his response to Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., pp. 83-96). After

According to the CCPA's generalized synopsis, the following are the relevant events of the December
22,2011, shooting of Mr. Wade by a Fruitland Police Officer:
1

On December 22, 2011, the Idaho State Police (lSP) received a call regarding an officer involved
shooting in New Plymouth, Idaho. The Fruitland police officer involved in the shooting had
responded to a call of an intoxicated person making threats to kill his mother. Upon arrival, the
Officer observed a white male (Mr. Wade) step out of a sports utility vehicle parked in the
driveway and begin walking toward the officer's patrol car in an "aggressive and determined
manner." The officer ordered the suspect to stop without success. The officer then ordered him
to stop or "he would shoot." The suspect continued toward the officer stating "fucking do it then."
The officer fired two rounds at the suspect, the suspect then grasped his chest and moaned before
stumbling to the ground. The officer ordered the suspect to stay on the ground, to which the
suspect responded "fuck you" and got to his feet. The officer then began to back pedal away from
his patrol car in an attempt to create some distance and continued to give the suspect commands
to remain on the ground. The suspect refused to comply and continued to pursue the officer, at
this point the officer fired three additional rounds and the suspect fell to the ground. A second
officer arrived on scene and the two officers secured the suspect and called emergency medical
services.
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hearing argument on Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, the Court issued its
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER UPON MOTION TO AL TER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT (R., pp. 99-102). The latter decision and order granted Mr. Wade's request;
however, access was limited to Mr. Wade and Mr. Wade's counsel, the contents of which could
not "be disclosed outside of the pending Tort Claim before Payette County or any subsequent
civil litigation that may result from said tort claim" (R., pp. 102 and 109). On July 11, 2012,
CCPA filed the present appeal (R., pp. 104-108). On July 20, 2012, the Court ordered that its
June 29, 2012, memorandum decision and order be stayed pending the outcome of the present
appeal (R., p.2). On October 5, 2012, the Court amended to its July 20, 2012, Judgment and
made allowance for Mr. Wade to seek attorney fees in District Court at the conclusion of the
present appeal (R., p. 111). On September 11, 2012, Mr. Wade filed a civil rights complaint in
Federal Court (Dkt. 25., p. 4)? On November 7,2012, Mr. Wade served CCPA with a subpoena
which sought among other items the complete investigative file compiled by Canyon County
(Dkt. 25., p. 4). On December 6,2012, after the time had expired for CCPA to comply with the
subpoena, CCPA filed a motion to quash the subpoena (Dkt. 25., p. 4). On December 11,2012,
in response to a discovery request for production, the city of Fruitland produced its reports and
records of the December 22,2011, officer involved shooting incident (Dkt. 25., p. 5). The latter
request for production was identical to the March 22,2012, public records request (Dkt. 25., p. 5)
and (R. p. 27). After reviewing briefs submitted by both Mr. Wade and the CCPA, the Federal
District Court denied in part and granted in part the CCPA's motion to quash and issued its

2 On

January 31,2013, Respondent submitted his MOTION REQUESTING THAT THE COURT TAKE
mDICIAL NOTICE ofDkt. 25 Memorandum Decision and Order, entered in Federal District Court Case
No. 1:12-cv-00465-CWD, January 14, 2013, pursuant to I.A.R. 32(c) and I.R.E. 201. Respondent,
anticipating a favorable ruling on the motion refers to subject Memorandum Decision and Order in this
brief as Dkt. 25.
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MEMORANDUM DECSION AND ORDER on January 14,2013, (Dkt. 25). Dkt. 25 provided
that the complete investigative file compiled by the CCPA be produced; however, the disclosure
would be limited to Mr. Wade and his legal counsel (Dkt., 25 p. 12). Thus through the discovery
process, a process advocated by the Appellant, Mr. Wade has access to all of the documents
requested from the CCPA through Mr. Wade's public writings request.

B. Additional Issue on Appeal
Does the Court Lack Jurisdiction to Hear The Present Appeal?
C. Attorney Fees on Appeal

Respondent requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. §§ 9-335(4), 9-344(2), 12121, and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).

4

ISSUES

1. Does the Idaho Supreme Court Have Jurisdiction to Hear the Present Case on
Appeal?
2. Did the District Court Err by Ordering the Disclosure of a Police Investigation of an
Officer-Involved Shooting While the Matter was Being Reviewed by the Canyon
County Prosecuting Attorney?

5

ARGUMENTS
1. The Idaho Supreme Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Hear the Present Case on
Appeal as the Issues Presented by the CCP A are Moot.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue of mootness is jurisdictional and can be raised at any time including the first
time on appeal. Even when not raised by the parties, the Court has a duty to raise the issues of
standing and mootness sua sponte. As the issue is jurisdictional, the Court exercises free review
in making its decision as to whether an issue is moot which implicates the jurisdiction of the
Court. See Arambarri v. Armstrong 152 Idaho 734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Idaho, 2012)
citing Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd ofComm'rs, 151 Idaho 228,231,254 P.3d 1224, 1227
(2011); In re Doe 1, 145 Idaho 337, 340, 179 P.3d 300,303 (2008) and Johnson v. Blaine Cnty.,

146 Idaho 916, 924,204 P.3d 1127, 1135 (2009); In re Doe 1, 145 Idaho at 340, 179 P.3d at 303.
1.

The Issue of Whether the Court Erred in Granting Mr. Wade His
Request Under the Idaho Public Records Act has Become Moot as the
Questions Presented are No Longer at Issue and a Favorable Decision
by this Court Could Not Grant the Relief Sought by the CCP A.

Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court relying on developed jurisprudence addressed the
question of when a case becomes moot. The Court found that:
An issue is moot if it "does not present a real and substantial controversy that is capable
of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief." Ameritel Inns, Inc. v.
Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849,851, 119 P.3d 624,626 (2005). An
"issue is also moot if a favorable judicial decision would not result in any relief or the
party lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." See Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227,
91 P.3d at 1131.
Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 739, 274 P.3d 1249, 1254 (Idaho,2012)3
See also Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183 (U.S.Neb.,1982) which
stated the following:

3

In general, a case becomes moot "'when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.' " United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,

6

The CCP A asserts in its brief that the District Court erred in its ruling that Mr. Wade was
entitled to the public records that he sought. The CCP A in support of its position argues that the
applicable statutes exempt investigatory records that are under prosecutorial review. The CCPA
also argues that Idaho Public Records Act should not be used "as a way around discovery". The
CCP A has asked on appeal that the decision of the District Court be reversed. Yet the record
before this Court is clear, Mr. Wade, through the discovery process, has obtained access to all the
documents sought by him through the Idaho Public Records Act. As noted herein, in response to
a discovery request for production, the City of Fruitland produced its reports and records of the
officer involved shooting incident (Dkt. 25., p. 5). The request for production was identical the
March 22,2012, public records request (Dkt. 25., p. 5) and (R. p. 27). Later, through Dkt. 25, the
complete investigative file compiled by the CCPA was ordered to be produced; however, the
disclosure would be limited to Mr. Wade and his legal counsel (Dkt., 25 p. 12). Thus through
the discovery process, a process advocated by the Appellant, Mr. Wade has access to all of the
documents requested from the CCPA through Mr. Wade's public writings request. As noted in
Arambarri v. Armstrong, supra, an issue is moot if a favorable judicial decision would not result

in any relief. If this Court were to grant the relief sought by the Appellant, it would have no
practical effect, as Mr. Wade has obtained or has access to all of the information requested in his
public writings request.
The appeal is also moot, as the CCPA has no cognizable interest in the outcome of the
appeal. The only legal interest that CCPA had in the case was the non-disclosure of the
investigatory records that they claimed were exempt.

Once those documents were released

445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208,63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), quoting Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 496,89 S.Ct. 1944, 1950,23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).
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through discovery and by order of the Federal District Court, the CCPA had no other cognizable
legal interest. The CCP A did not seek attorney fees nor did the CCPA represent a class of
County Prosecutors or some other legally recognized class.
11.

The Present Appeal Does Not Meet Any of the Exceptions to the
Mootness Doctrine that Would Allow This Court to Exercise Its
Jurisdiction.

Three established exceptions to the mootness doctrine allow a court to exercise its
jurisdiction. Those three exceptions are:
1. When there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person
raising the issue;
2. When the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of
repetition; and
3. When an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest.

Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851-852, 119 P.3d 624,
626 - 627 (Idaho, 2005).

a) The CCPA's Appeal Does Not Satisfy the First Exception to the Mootness Doctrine
as no Cognizable Legal Consequences will be Imposed on the Appellant.
Where a case or the principal issue in a case has become moot, it is sometimes possible
for a plaintiff, or as in this case an appellant, to be entitled to some other form of relief. In these
cases, judicial discretion must be exercised to prevent the exception from swallowing the
mootness doctrine. 4 The only cognizable legal interest that CCPA had in the present appeal is
the non-disclosure of the investigatory records that they claimed were exempt.

Once those

"Judicial discretion must be exercised to limit the effectiveness of this argument to the unusual
case, and appeals have been dismissed where the additional relief sought was found to be merely
ancillary to the relief now impossible to grant. By including a count for damages in his original
complaint, the plaintiff may be able to avoid the ancillary doctrine, which seems to have been
applied only in cases in which the alternative relief was sought merely as an afterthought after
the case had become moot. Applicable procedural rules must, of course, be consulted to
determine the propriety of such joinder of legal and equitable relief. 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 772, 779
(1955). See also Murphy v. Hunt 455 U.S. 478 at 482
4
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documents were voluntarily released through discovery and by order of the Federal District
Court through a subpoena, the CCP A had no other cognizable legal interest. No other ancillary
relief was sought.
b) The Second Exception to the Mootness Doctrine is Inapplicable as the Challenged
Conduct is Not Likely to Evade Judicial Review and Thus be Capable of Repetition.

The second exception to the mootness doctrine is limited to situations where there is a
combination for two elements: "(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation or
demonstrated probability that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action
again." AMJUR APPELLATE § 602.
The case of Us. v. Quattron, 402 F.3d 304 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 2005) is a good example of the
application of this rule. In Quattron, the press and other media organizations appealed an order
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York that prevented them,
during pendency of criminal trial, from publishing the names of jurors disclosed in open court.
The Court in trying to avoid a mistrial that had occurred in another case as a result of a juror's
name becoming public, issued an order that no member of the press or other media were to
divulge the names of any prospective or selected juror until the Court issued an order allowing
the publication of the names.

At a hearing on the record, the Court explained to media

representatives that the restriction would cease the moment the trial ended. A coalition of media
organizations appealed the Court's order. Prior to ruling on the merits of the appeal, the Court
addressed the issue of its having jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Appellate Court noted that
the underlying case had been resolved and the order lifted. The Appellate Court noted that the
challenged action had been removed making the appeal moot. Properly applying the capable or
repetition, yet evading review doctrine, the Court noted the following:

9

Despite this general rule of mootness, the instant appeal, like the appeal in
Stewart, remains justiciable, because "the underlying dispute is 'capable of
repetition, yet evading review.' " Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1,6,106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986)). This exception to the
mootness doctrine permits federal courts to decide a case where "(1) the
challenged action was in duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party will be subjected to the same action again."

us. v.

Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 309 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 2005).

The underlying dispute in the present appeal is the release of investigatory records that
the CCPA asserts should not have been released by the District Court in response to Mr. Wade's
public writings request. Yet, it was through the very mechanism of discovery endorsed by the
CCPA that Mr. Wade obtained documents and access to all the documents Mr. Wade requested
in his public writings request making this appeal moot (App. Brief., pp.34-37 and 39) (R., pp.8
and 80-81). Yet, had the CCPA taken advantage of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, it is
doubtful that the present appeal would have become moot.
In the present case, the CCPA could have taken the necessary steps to assert that the
records requested to be produced in discovery were being withheld under Id. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)
which provides protection from the release of privileged information through discovery of
documents as follows:
(5) (A) Privileged Information Withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise
discoverable under these rules by claiming it is privileged or subject to protection as trial
preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the
nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a
manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable
other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.
(B) Privileged Information Produced. When a party produces information without
intending to waive a claim of privilege it may, within a reasonable time, notify any party
that received the information of its claim of privilege. After being notified, a party must
promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies. The
producing party must comply with Rule 26(b)(5)(A) with regard to the information and
preserve it pending a ruling by the court. (Emphasis added)
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In making its argument to the District Court, the CCP A never asserted that the records
sought by Mr. Wade were privileged and therefore not subject to release. The only argument
made by the CCPA to support the non-disclosure of the records being sought was that disclosure
could possibly taint the testimony of Mr. Wade in a grand jury proceeding or preliminary
hearing (R.pp.53, 100). It was not until the CCPA moved to quash the subpoena served upon
them by Mr. Wade in case 1:12-cv-00465-CWD that the CCPA specifically asserted that the
documents being required to be produced would require the disclosure of privileged information
(Dkt. 25., pp. 2,7-8 ). The Federal District Court, for the same reason as the District Court,
rejected the rationale of the CCPA for preventing the disclosure of the requested records. The
Federal District Court found no privilege existed. Additionally, the Federal District Court noted
that the CCPA failed to produce a privilege log for the Court's review (Dkt. 25., p.9 fn.5).5
Therefore, had the CCP A taken the precaution of formally designating specific documents
privileged, constructing a privilege log, and withholding the information requested per Id. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(5) no document would have been disclosed, prior to this Court's considering the
present appeal. As the Federal District Court noted, "And, the cat is now out of the bag." The
rules are established to ensure that a case such as the present does not avoid judicial review. The
present case is moot not because rules allow repeated escape from judicial scrutiny. The present
case is moot because the CCPA failed to take the necessary precautions to ensure that a favorable
ruling on the issues presented for appeal could be concluded through a judicial decree of specific
relief.

The Federal District Court also noted that production of the documents through discovery
process having occurred "could therefore deem the issue in a practical sense moot." The analysis
herein shows that the issue is not only moot in a practical sense but is moot as a matter oflaw.
5

11

c) The Third Exception to the Mootness Doctrine is Inapplicable as the Moot Issue
Does Not Satisfy the Test of Raising Concerns of Substantial Public Interest.
The central issue presented in the present appeal is whether investigatory records under
prosecutorial review are exempt from disclosure. Assuming that the central issue of the appeal is
of substantial public interest, it is not an issue that the Court has not addressed. The case of
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624, (Idaho,

2005) is instructive. In Ameritel Inns, an election had been held with a questionable expenditure
of public funds to campaign in favor of a bond issue. As the election had been held, the issue
was moot. However, despite the apparent mootness of the issue, the Court considered the issue
using the following rationale:
The substantive issue presented in this case is whether public entities can use public
funds to campaign in an election. That is an issue of substantial public interest that this
Court has not yet addressed. We will therefore address the issue to provide guidance and
direction in the future. (Emphasis added)
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., at 852, 627.

The present appeal does not meet the Ameritel test. Where overriding considerations of
policy exist in regard to the releasing of investigatory records, the Idaho Courts have set forth
the controlling rule of law. In doing so, the Court established an unambiguous guide for the
future conduct of law enforcement bodies. The issue of when and under what circumstances
investigatory records can be released under the Idaho Public Records Act has been addressed in
detail; see Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 787 (Idaho, 2003) and Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho
792 (Idaho, 2002). Therefore, the present case is not justiciable under the substantial public
interest doctrine.
There are four principal categories or classifications of cases that are considered
sufficiently important to invoke the public policy interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
The first classification consists of election matters. The second classification is those cases in
12

which the decisions of an administrative agency are challenged but the decisions become moot
prior to reaching an appellate court. The third classification is when the question relates to local
government powers and procedures such as when a municipal power under a state statute is
questioned. The fourth classification involves questions of the constitutionality of a statute.
These four classifications are discussed at length at 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 772, 788 -793 (1955).
The issue central to the present appeal does not fit into any of the four principal classifications to
invoke the public policy interest exception.
2. Through its Interpretation of the Applicable Statute, The District Court Did Not Err By
Ordering the Disclosure of a Police Investigation of an Officer-Involved Shooting While
The Matter Was Being Reviewed by the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney.
The standard of review in a case of statutory interpretation has been well settled:
This Court exercises free review over questions of law, including the interpretation of a
statute. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't ofAgric., 143 Idaho 366,
368, 146 P .3d 632, 634 (2006). Such an interpretation begins with the literal words of
the statute, and "{wJhere the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." Id. If a
statute is ambiguous, this Court attempts to ascertain the Legislature's intent by
examining the "language used, the reasonableness of proposed interpretations, and the
policy behind the statute."
Wardv. PortneufMedical Center, Inc., 150 Idaho 501, 504, 248 P.3d 1236,1239 (Idaho,
2011) citing Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc. v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 138 Idaho
143,144,59 P.3d 314,315 (2002).6
The primary issue before this Court

IS

whether the District Court erred in its

interpretation of the Idaho Public Records Act. Contrary to the CCP A's assertions in its brief,
there is sufficient case law regarding the standard of review. CCPA urges this Court to look
outside of Idaho Law to interpret an Idaho Statute regarding the disclosure of investigatory
records. However, Idaho has established sufficient case law to exercise its free review of Title 9,
Chapter 3 cases to include the disclosure of investigatory records presented in this case. See
6

See also Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794-795, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 - 1214 (Idaho, 2002)
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Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 796-795, 53 P.3d 1211, 1215 (Idaho, 2002), Federated
Publications, Inc. v. Boise City, 128 Idaho 459, 915 P.2d 21 (Idaho, 1996).
1.

The Investigatory Records Under Prosecutorial Review Were Not Exempt From
Disclosure; Therefore, the Court Did Not Err in Ordering the Disclosure.

The documents and recordings requested by Mr. Wade were public records. Pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 9-338, the District Court correctly determined that Mr. Wade had a right to
examine and take a copy of such records unless access to such records are expressly prohibited

by statute. See Federated Publications, Inc. v. Boise City, 128 Idaho 459, 461, 915 P.2d 21,23
(Idaho, 1996). Mr. Wade's request to the CCPA contained the following language:
This request is being sent to you based upon the denial of my public writings
request filed with the Payette County Prosecuting Attorney. The Payette County
Prosecuting Attorney has informed me that all materials were forwarded to your
office. Specifically, Ms. Kelso stated the following:
I am in receipt of your public records request. Please note that this office
is not in possession of any documents or items you have requested. Upon
completion of the Idaho State Police Investigation, all materials were
forwarded to the Canyon County Prosecutor's Officefor Review. I'm
enclosing the letter sent to Canyon County. (Emphasis added)
It is my understanding that the investigative effort of the lead investigative agency
(the Idaho State Police) has been completed; see the enclosure to this
correspondence. It is also my understanding that both the Fruitland Police
Department's and the Payette County Sheriff s Office have been completed in this
matter. Therefore, the exemption under I.C. 9-335(1) and 9-340B are inapplicable
as providing the requested completed investigations would not:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Interfere with an enforcement proceeding;
Deprive, my client or the un-named officer of a fair trial;
Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
Disclose the identity of a confidential source; nor the information provided
by a confidential source;
Disclose investigative techniques and procedures; nor
Endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
(Exhibit "E") (R., p. 7).
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The denial of Mr. Wade's request cited Idaho Code Section 9-335, which was
inapplicable. The subject investigations had been completed and were only under review by the
Canyon County Prosecutor. A review of other agencies' investigations, upon which the Canyon
County Prosecutor could rely upon to make a charging decision, did not make the subject
investigations completed by the Idaho State Police, the Fruitland Police Department, and the
Payette County Sherriff's Office any less complete. Further, Mr. Wade had a right under Idaho
Code to examine and make a copy of the subject requested records that were denied by the
Canyon County Prosecutor.

It must be noted that Idaho Code Sections 9-342(3)(a) and 9-

342(3)(b) are inapplicable as the documents requested unequivocally referred to completed
investigations and associated public writings and not on-going investigations. In the Appellant's
brief, the CCPA discusses at length how the disclosure of the requested records could or might
affect a person receiving an impartial trial or adjudication and could or might constitute an
unwarranted invasion of privacy.

However, this discussion is unpersuasive in light of the

relevant unambiguous and mandatory language of the applicable statute which reads as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding any statute or rule of court to the contrary, nothing in this chapter
nor chapter 10, title 59, Idaho Code, shall be construed to require disclosure of
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes by a law enforcement
agency, but such exemption from disclosure applies only to the extent that the

production o/such records would:
(a) Interfere with enforcement proceedings;
(b) Deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication;
(c) Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(d) Disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record
compiled by a criminal law enforcement agency in the course of a criminal
investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source;
(e) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures; or
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(f) Endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
(3) An inactive investigatory record shall be disclosed unless the disclosure would violate
the provisions of subsection (l)(a) through (f) of this section. (Emphasis added)
Idaho Code § 9-335.
The discussion of the Appellant in pages 15 through 21 of its brief notwithstanding, the
CCPA has not cited to any authority that says that the mandatory language of the statute is not
controlling. CCP A argues extensively that the "proper judicial interpretation of the Idaho PRA
requires an analysis of the case law regarding the FOIA" (App. Brief., pp. 23-34). Appellant
concludes the legislative history of the FOIA "provides evidence that Mr. Wade's request should
be denied" (App. Brief., p. 28). Appellant contends that as the District Court failed to explore
"any statutory definitions of "interference," the state or federal legislative history, or the wealth
of federal case law on this topic" that the District Court's analysis was fatally flawed (App.
Brief., p. 34). Though the CCPA provides a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the
FOIA and how it is interpreted in various federal jurisdictions nation-wide, the CCPA fails to
come to grips with well-established Idaho law regarding statutory interpretation that holds:
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free review."
Magic Valley Newsps., Inc., 138 Idaho at 144, 59 P.3d at 315 (citing Lopez v. State,
Indus. Spec. Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 174,30 P.3d 952 (2001)). "Interpretation of a
statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words." Idaho Conserv. League,
Inc. v. Idaho State Dept. ofAgric., 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006) (citing
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999)). "Where the language
of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as written,
without engaging in statutory construction." Id (citing State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,
462,988 P.2d 685,688 (1999)). (Emphasis added)

Cowles Pub. Co. v. Kootenai County Bd of County Com 'rs, 144 Idaho 259,262, 159
P.3d 896,899 (Idaho, 2007).

The language of the Idaho Code Section 9-335 being plain and unambiguous, the District Court
was correct in its analysis that the records requested by Mr. Wade were not exempt. Therefore,
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the District Court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the requested records and was on point
in making the following analysis:
Respondents point out that the Canyon County Prosecutor's Office is a law enforcement
agency under the language I.C. §9-335 and ifthese documents were disclosed it could
interfere with enforcement proceedings, and/or deprive a person of a right to a fair trial,
or an impartial adjudication. (Rpp.51-52)
Indeed, the Petition for access to these records argues that all of the subject investigations
have been completed. Further, Petitioner cites to a letter written by the Payette County
Prosecuting Attorney declaring that her office was no longer in possession of the
documents as they had been forwarded to the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
"[Ujpon completion of the Idaho State Police Investigation". Emphasis added.
Nevertheless, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office continues to maintain
that this remains on ongoing investigation even though over four and one-half months
have gone by with no activity. I.C. § 9-335(3) clearly sets forth that an "inactive
investigatory record shall be disclosed unless the disclosure would violate the provisions
of subsection (1)( a) through (f)" of this code section. Emphasis added. The only
provisions that the State claims are possibly applicable are (a) and (b). Thus, in order for
this Court to find that the investigation file possessed by the (Rp.52) Canyon county
Prosecuting Attorney is exempt from disclosure, it must find that disclosure will interfere
with enforcement proceedings or deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudicatory hearing. (Rp.53)
The only argument presented by the State to support such a finding is that disclosure
would possibly taint the testimony of the Petitioner in a grand jury proceeding or
preliminary hearing ... The language of the statute does not state that the records are
exempt from disclosure if production might possibly interfere with enforcement
proceedings. The statute requires that interference would result. This Court cannot make
that finding. (Rpp.53, 100)
The record clearly establishes the District Court was aware of its duty to act within
established Idaho law. Rather than as suggested by the Appellant that it conduct an extensive
analysis of foreign jurisdictions' applications ofthe FOIA in interpreting the Idaho Code Section
9-335, the District Court ably explained that in making its determination as to the meaning of the
statute, it was following established Idaho jurisprudence:

In the analysis set forth above, the Court was attempting to follow the plain
meaning of the statute. "The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive legislative
intent." Robison v.Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because
the best guide to legislative intent is the words of the statute itself, "the interpretation of a
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statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the
statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as
written.'" Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892, 265
P.3d 502, 505 (2011); citing State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721
(2003). The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed
legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. Id.
It is this Court's opinion that the statute clearly sets forth a requirement that
disclosure of the relevant documents, to be exempt, must interfere with enforcement
proceedings and/or deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication.
The pertinent language of the statute that this Court relies upon is "such exemption from
disclosure applies only to the extent that the production of such records would: (a)
Interfere with enforcement proceedings; (b) Deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication ... " I.C. § 9-335 (a) Emphasis added
The State now cites subsections (1)( c) and (1)( e). These arguments were not
made in opposition to the Petition at the original hearing and thus will not be considered.
(R. p. 101) (Emphasis in the original text)
11.

The District Court's Granting of Mr. Wade's Request Did Not Serve as a Way
Around Discovery.

Mr. Wade filed his public writings request so that he would have information to file a
complete and meaningful tort claim to comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act (lTCA). The
ITCA does not provide for a hearing in which a party can be compelled to produce documents to
support a claimant's position or otherwise inform the claimant of facts that may weaken the
claim. In short, the ITCA does not provide a discovery mechanism. Idaho Code Section 9343(3) reads in pertinent part as follows:

Nothing contained in sections 9-337 through 9-348, Idaho Code, shall limit the
availability of documents and records for discovery in the normal course ofjudicial or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings, subject to the law and rules of evidence and of
discovery governing such proceedings. Additionally, in any criminal appeal or postconviction civil action, sections 9-335 through 9-348, Idaho Code, shall not make
available the contents of prosecution case files where such material has previously been
provided to the defendant nor shall sections 9-335 through 9-348, Idaho Code, be

available to supplement, augment, substitute or supplant discovery procedures in any
other federal, civil or administrative proceeding. (Emphasis added)
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The only avenue available to Mr. Wade to bring or amend an existing tort claim with
sufficient information held by the CCP A was to seek the information under the Idaho Public
Writings Act. Mr. Wade's request was not an attempt to supplement, augment, substitute, or
supplant discovery procedures in a civil or administrative proceeding. Through the filing of Mr.
Wade's Petition for Access to Public Records, the Court was made aware that the reason Mr.
Wade initiated his requests was to gain information that would allow Mr. Wade to submit a
comprehensive tort claim (R., p.4).

What the CCPA fails to understand is that it is of no

significance that Mr. Wade specifically stated why he was making the public writings request.
What is significant is that the Court applied the law without regard to Mr. Wade's desires.
Rather, the Court applied the law as mandated by the Idaho Code Section 9-335 and applicable
Idaho jurisprudence.
3. The District Court Did Not Usurp the Discretion Allowed the CCPA by Creating a Filing
Deadline.
The IP AA argues that the District Court infringed upon the discretion of the CCPA by
creating a filing deadline. This is the only assertion made by the CCPA and the IP AA that is not
duplicative in their Appellant and Amicus briefs respectively. Nothing could be further from the
truth. Respondent has previously addressed this argument in its PETITIONER'S RESPONSE
TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT and incorporates the
relevant portions of the latter herein as follows:
During the May 4,2012, hearing, the Court did not order, insinuate, or say to the
Respondent [Appellant] that it was giving Respondent[Appellant] two weeks to make a
charging decision. Indeed, the Court provided the Respondent [Appellant] a thirteen (13)
day period (May 13, 2012 - May 17, 2012) in which to review the files to ascertain
which documents could be released to the Petitioner. On May 17, 2012, when the
Respondent [Appellant] maintained it was not required to nor was Respondent
[Appellant] inclined to provide Mr. Wade with any documents the Court made the
decision to review the Respondent's [Appellant'] records in camera. Upon completion of
that review, the Court issued its June 5, 2012, Memorandum Decision. Nowhere in the
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Memorandum Decision did the Court state, nor in any way indicate that the
Respondent[Appellant] was or had been limited to two (2) weeks from any defined time
period to make a final charging decision. Indeed, a close review of the Memorandum
Decision finds that the word "two" was only used one time in relation to the binders
containing the Petitioner's medical records and the words "week" or "weeks" do not
appear in the Memorandum Decision.
Contrary to the assertion made by
Respondent[Appllant], the Court in no way tried to force the Respondent to make a quick
charging decision. Therefore, the Court did not "encroach upon the constitutionally
mandated authority" of the Respondent [Appellant] as alleged in Respondent's
[Appellant's] Memorandum. The Respondent's [Appellant's] position has no basis in fact
or existing law.
a. The Court Has Made No Determination Whom the Respondent Could Charge
As noted by the Respondent [Appellant] and herein, on May 17, 2012, when the
Respondent[Appellant], maintained it was not required to nor was Respondent[Appellant]
inclined to provide Mr. Wade with any documents, the Court made the decision to review
the Respondent's[Appellant's] records in camera. Upon completion of that review, the
Court issued its June 5, 2012, Memorandum Decision. In that decision, the Court
specifically stated the following:
The only possible persons who might be placed on trial over this incident are the
Petitioner Wade or the Fruitland Police Officer. Whether either person is charged
with a crime is undecided. Indeed, the State may conclude that the evidence does
not support a criminal charge against either party. But in the event a criminal
charge is brought, this Court cannot find that disclosure of these documents would
deprive either person of a fair trial or an impartial adjudication.
The Court arrived at this opinion based on its in camera review and analysis of
the record that existed at the time it was provided to the Court by the
Respondent[Appellant]. The Court undertook and completed its in camera review to
consider Mr. Wade's petition and the position taken by Respondent[Appellant] to deny
the Petitioner access to the public writings requested by the Petitioner. There is nothing
in the Court's language that remotely suggests that the Court restrained the
Respondent [Appellant] from charging anyone other than Officer Bill Copeland or Mr.
Jamee Wade as Respondent[Appellant] deems appropriate as a result of the December
22,2011, incident.
(R., pp. 90-92).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that this Court decline to exercise
jurisdiction in this appeal as the appeal is moot. Should this Court exercise its jurisdiction in this
matter, it is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the District Court's Decision to grant
Mr. Wade's Petition for Access to Public Records. Further given the following:
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(a) That given the clear and unambiguous language of Idaho Code Section 9-335(1)
and Idaho jurisprudence mandating how a Court must interpret a statute;
(b) That the District Court properly performed its duty in applying the statute;
(c) That Appellant's denial of the public records request was unjustified and
frivolously pursued; and
(d) That the Appellant with knowledge of pending litigation took no steps to ensure
that the issues on appeal would not become moot.
Respondent [utiher requests that he be granted his attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code Sections 9-335(4), 9-344(2), 12-121, and Id. R. Civ. P. 54(e)(1).
DATED this 31 st day of January, 2013.
CAMACHO MENDOZA COULTER LA W GROUP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3 151 day of January, 2013, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
BRYAN TAYLOR
MICHAEL PORTER
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
1115 ALBANY STREET
CALDWELL,ID 83605

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile:
( ) Email:

IDAHO PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
417 S.6TH STREET
BOrSE, ID 83702

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile:
( ) Email:

DANIEL G. CHADWICK
IDAHO ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
700 WEST WASHINGTON STREET
PO BOX 1623
BOISE, ID 83701-1623

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile:
( ) Email:

JAMES K. DICKINSON
SENIOR DEP. PROSECUTING ATfORNEY
200 WEST FRONT STREET, ROOM 366
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

(x) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile:
( ) Email:
CAMACHO MENDOZA COULTER

By: RJ\. (RON) COULTER
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